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Supreme Court Review

murder. But he did not tell the jury that they might bring in a verdict
of manslaughter if they believed the accused acted under provocation.
A new trial was ordered.
However, a trial judge is not required to instruct a jury on an
alternative defense which is not raised by counsel where there is no
evidence or foundation of fact which would justify such a direction or
which cannot reasonably be supported on any view of the evidence. 26
It is submitted that in this case there was no sufficient foundation in
fact justifying a direction of a possible verdict of drunkenness and that
the Supreme Court was correct in restoring the decision of the trial
judge on the matter.

Koury v. The Queen [1964] S.C.R. 212.
FRANK K. ROBERTS*

CRIMINAL LAW - RES JUDICATA - POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO
REVERSE A TRIAL COURT DECISION ON ONE CHARGE WHEN APPEAL IS
TAKEN ONLY AS TO THE DECISION ON OTHER CHARGE.

This was an Appeal by the accused, Koury, from a Judgment of the
Court of Appeal for Ontario upholding the conviction for fraud of the
four co-accused, upholding the conviction for conspiracy of the three
accused, other than Koury, and upholding the acquittal of the accused
Koury on a conspiracy charge to commit the fraud for which he was
in fact convicted.
The sole issue of the Appeal was whether the conviction of Koury
of fraud was inconsistent with his acquittal on the charge of conspiracy to commit that very fraud. In acquitting the accused of
conspiracy, the Jury must have found that he withdrew from the
association before the conspiracy had been entered into. The case put
against Koury on the fraud count was that he was an aider and abettor
and therefore the Crown had to show a conscious participation in a
common design and conscious and deliberate assistance between the
aider and abettor and the other persons.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that aiding
and abetting persuant to a common intent and design is not necessarily
the same thing as conspiracy.
Mullins v. The Queen (1952), 15 C.R. 99.
(Que. Q.B., Appeal Side)
Rex v. Malanik (1951), 13 C.R. 160, 1 W.W.R. (N.S.) 577.
101 C.C.CQ 182 (Man. C.A.); affirmed, [19521 2 S.C.R. 335, 14 C.R. 367,
103 C.C.C. 1.
Rex v. Gauthier (1943), 29 Cr. App. R. 189.
Rex, v. Flett, (1943) 1 W.W.R. 672, 69 B.C.R. 25, 79 C.C.C. 183, [19431 2
D.L.R. 656.
Rex v. Thorpe (1925), 18 Cr. App. R. 189.
*Mr. Roberts is a lawyer with the firm of Keith, Ganong, Mahony and
Keith.
26

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 3

The argument on behalf of the accused in the Kravenia case1 was
that the trial Judge ought to have instructed the Jury that there is a
difference in law between two people aiding and abetting one another
in a specific crime, and in conspiring to commit that very crime and
that the mere fact that one aided and abetted in a crime might not be
conspiring to commit that crime. Fauteux J. for the majority (Cartwright J. dissenting) adopted this distinction and held that there was
no obligation on the trial Judge to instruct the Jury as to the differences between the crime charged and another crime for which the
accused was not indicted. The majority in the Koury case held that,
on the particular facts before them, the verdict of guilty of the specific
offence was not inconsistent with an acquittal on a charge of conspiracy to commit that offence.
The Court, however, decided to go farther. It stated, in obiter
dictum, that an appeal court can review an acquittal by a trial court
even though the acquittal is not before the court on appeal. At page
218 of the Koury report, Spence J. for the Majority states:
On the evidence that we can now examine, the error, if any, is in the
acquittal on the charge of conspiracy and not in the conviction on the
substantive offence ....
We are not compelled to defer to this acquittal
for the purpose of quashing the conviction on fraud. We are not engaged
in a process of logic chopping and we are entitled to look behind the
record of the acquittal.

In my respectful submission the Court has gone too far in making
this wide and dangerous statement. Cartwright J. in his dissent refers
to the defence of res judicata. The principle upon which the general
doctrine of res judicata is based is that once a matter has been judicially determined, the determination at least as between the same
parties, should be accepted as final and conclusive: interestreipublicae
ut sit finis litum. res judicatais a common law defence.
If the statement of the majority is accepted as good law, the whole
general defence of res judicata is put in question together with the
basic theory against double jeopardy. If the Court on Appeal is permitted to look behind the reasons for an acquittal not appealed from,
that is to say to look behind a final verdict and say: "On the evidence
that we can now examine, the error . . . is in the acquittal (not
appealed from and not before the Court) ... and not in the conviction (appealed from and before the Court)"; then the Common law
defence of res judicata, specifically preserved by Section 7 of the
Criminal Code, is, if not abolished, certainly thoroughly shaken.
1 The Queen v. Kravenia, [1955] S.C.R. 616.

